Dynamic Stability, Wage Subsidies and the Generalized







atli~hedby the dhvemmentof Pakistanin 1957,is anautonomousresearch
{~dJpcarrringout fundamentalresearchondevelopmenteconomicsin general
't;,corlbmij:;problemsin particuUu.Its research,besidesprovidinga firmfounda-
'.' ';pol1cy-makingcanbebased,alsoprovidesawindowthroughwhichthe




































In a recent contribution, Neary has shown that paradoxesand instability
correspondin the two-sectormodel with proportionaldifferentialsin factor
returns,leadingone to downgradethe importanceof theseparadoxes.In this
paper,we examinethe extent to which this resultextendsto the Generalized
Harris-TodaroModel of which the proportionaldifferentialsettingis a simple
specialcase. In developingthe argument,we generatea varietyof comparative-





It is bynowwellkllownthatin thepresenceof factor-marketdistortions,a
sectormaybemorecapital-intensiven physicaltermsandlesscapital-intensiven
valuetermsandthatthisleadstoa theoryriddledwithparadoxes;eeMagee[16]
or Hazari[11] foracomprehensivetr atment.In morespecificterms,Rybczynski's
111eoremisdependenton
Sign[k (w ) - k (w)]u u r r (1.1)
whereastheStolper-SamuelsonTheoremrelieson
; Sign [8uK/8uL - 8rK/8rL] =Sign [8rL8uK - 8rK8uL] (1.2) It
I
..
. . wherek., w. and8'K/8'L arerespectivelythecapital-labourratio,thewage-rentalI I I I
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canbe shownthatsucha paradoxicaloutcomeis actuallypossibleon not too
implausibleassumptions.A sufficientconditionis simplythattherearefixed
coefficientsofproductioninbothsectorswiththeurbansectorbeingrelativelymore
capital-intensive.Theparadoxwouldstill followif somelimiteddegreeof technical
substitutionwerepossible."
In Khan[15], a generalizedHarris-Todaromodelis presentedin whichthe




[19],or theefficiencywage,asin Stiglitz[20],or thepresenceof tradeunions,as
in Calvo[6], or fromcostlysupervision,asin CalvoandWellisz(seeCalvo[5]).3
The modelalsoyieldsthetraditionalabsoluteor proportionalwage-differential
modelasaspecialcase.Thisgeneralizedmodelexhibits




to conflictingrankingsof thetwosectors.Specifically,equation(1.1)hasto be
replacedbyunemployment-adjustedfactorintensities,i.e.
Sign[~ (w)/(1 +X)- kr(wr)]=Sign[8rL8uK - 8rK8uL] (1.3)
2The expectedwageis the wagetimesthe probabilityof gettingajob, thisprobability
beingproxiedby theunemploymentrate.
3U may be worth pointingout that the discussionin Khan [15] makesno mentionof
eithertheefficiencywageor thecostlysupervisionhypothesis.







in thestandardcaseof a proportionalwagedifferential,equations(1.3)and(1.4)
becomeidenticaltoequations(1.1)and(1.2)respectively.
Giventhevarietyof labourmarketconditionsembracedby themodel,a





A changein thedifferentialis anexogenouschangein thespreadbetween
theruralandtheurbanwagesandachangein thedistortionis anexogenousshift
in thefunctiondeterminingtheurbanwage.
The fact that the generalizedHarris-Todaromodelwill exhibitperverse
responsesi obvious;whatis interestingin thelightof Neary'sworkis answersto
thefollowingquestions:
(a) Do(iii), (iv),and(v)hinge,like(i) and(ii),ontheagreementorconflictof
equations(1.3)and(1.4)?
(b) Doesthereexistanadjustmentmechanismunderwhichanequilibriumis
locallyasymptoticallystablewhenequation(1.3) is in agreementwith
equation(1.4),andunstableotherwise?
We obtainan affirmativeanswerto (b) anda mixedanswerto (a). These
resultsaresatisfyingfromtheviewpointof bothpolicyandtheoreticalnalysisand
alsohaveimplicationsfor normativeconotnics.Theeffectofurbanwagesubsidies
andtaxeson urbanemploymentandoutputis of interesto policymakersin
developingcountriesandtheresultsdelineatecircumstanceswhentheycanand
cannotignoreperverseresponses.In termsof analysis,notethattheresultsgive
furthersupporto theviewpointemphasizedin Khan[15] thattheHarris-Todaro
literatureshouldbe seenin the contextof the theoryof proportionalwage
differentials.5
For normativeconomicswehaveto turn to the work of Bhagwatiand
Srinivasan[3and18] whohavecomprehensivelystudiedwelfaretheoryofsecond-
bestpolicyinterventionsin a "small"as well as a "large"openeconomy.In
particular,theyhaveshownthatfor botha "small"anda "large"economy,"A
wagesubsidy(in manufacturing)will existwhichwill improvewelfareov~rlaissez




immobilecapitalanda rigidurbanwage,anda naturalquestionarisesasto the
conditionsunderwhichtheirpropositionisvalidwithintersectoralcapitalmobility
andin thevarietyof labourmarketsettingsasareimplicitin thegeneralizedHarris-
Todaromodel.Ourresults,alongwiththenotionofanexpenditur€:function,allow
one to answerthisquestionrathereasily;theeaseandeconomyofferedby the
dualityapproachalsosuggestwiderapplicability.
The paperproceedsas.follows. Section2 is devotedto a briefandstark
presentationof themodelandsomepreliminaryanalysis.Section3 presentsthe
variousparadoxesin theabstractsettingof themodelin itsfullgenerality.Section4
considersimplicationsof theresultsof Section3 fortheeffectof wagesubsidiesin
differinglabourmarketconditions.Section5 presentstheadjustmentprocessand
Section6 is devotedto theBhagwati-Srinivasanproposition.Thelastsectionof the
paperisdevotedtosomeconcludingremarks.
2. THEMODELANDPRELIMINARY ANALYSIS6
Let a countryconsistof an urbananda ruralsector,indexedby u andr
respectively,andbeendowedwithnon-negativeamountsof labour£ andcapitalK.
Let the ith sectorproducea commodityin amountX. in accordancewith a1
productionfunction
X. =F. (L., K. )1 I 1 1 i =uandr (2.1)
whichis assumedto be positivelyhomogeneousof degree1, twicecontinuously




paFlaK =pf' (k)=R=p aF laK =p f' (k )r r r rr r u u u uu u (2.2a)
p aFlaL =p (f (k ) - k f' (k )) =wr r r r r r rr r r (2.2b)
p aF laL =p (f (k ) - k f' (k)) =wu u u u u u uu u (2.2c)




6The model,morespecificallyequations(2.1) to (2,10), are reproducedfrom Khan
liS]. Theanalysis,of course,heavilyrelieson thetreatmentfoundin Jones [13;14].
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where7 is a shiftparameterandX is theratioof theunemployedto theurban
employed.ThusLu/Lu (1+X)canbetakento betheprobabilityoffmdingajobin
theurbansector,a formalizationdueto HarrisandTodaro[10]. Weshallassume
thattheurbanwageisendogenouslydeterminedandthatthisendogeneityisbrought
outby
Wu=Q (wr'X,R, T) (2.4)
whereT is ashiftparameter.For a discussionof themicrofoundationsofQ(.), see
Khan[15] aswellasTable1andSection4 below.For theimmediatediscussion,
allweneedarethefollowingelasticities:
ew ologQ(.) e.=ologQ~.),j =X,RandT
ologwr ' J olog)
(2.5)
TableI
TheMicrofoundationsof theFunction Q(w ,X,R,T)r
Additionof thefollowingtwoequationscompletesthespecificationof the
model.
K +K =KandL +L (1+X)=£r u r u (2.6)
Givenconstantreturnsto scaleandabsenceof jointproduction,wecanwrite
downthecostfunctionsineachsectoras
Pi=Ci (wi'R) i=u and r (2.7)
l
ElasticitiesofQ(.)
Labour-MarketConditions e eX eRw
1. IdenticalWagesl I 0 0
2. Proportional-DifferentialinWages 1 0 0
3. AbsoluteDifferentialinWages + 0 0
4. RigidUrbanWage 0 0 0
5. EfficiencyWage 0 0 0
6. LabourTurnover 0 - 0
7. TradeUnions + 0 ?





where°ij is the shareof factorj in the ith sector.
straightforwardcalculationsthatequation(2.8)yields














arLXr +auL (1+X)Xu=£ andarKXr +auKXu =I<. (2.11)

























K.-I<.a (w-R)-I<. a (w -R)r r r U U U
= (2.15)
QU(I +X)
£ - Q (I+X)XU




0";;;ew ..;;;I; eX ..;;;0; 0";;;eR ..;;;I and eT > O.
Forajustificationof this,seeTableI andSection4 below.





on thesignof 101==°rL °uK -OuL °rK since
(OuK+OuLeR) °uLew °ULexl lit I I Pu-OULeTT
°rK °rL 0 I
lW,I-I
1\ I (2.8)
-eR I-e I-eX I XI I eTT- fw
I<.u I<.r I I Xul I K-I<.aK-1<.a Kr r u u
= (2.12)
Qu(1+X) Qr I I Xr I £-QaL-Q (1+X)Ii L-Qu(1+X)Xr r u u
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X/'t =e-rl..°uKOrL- °uL°rK)/IAI (3.2.1)





Wr- It =-[(1-eX)/IAl]pu (3.3.1a)




Sign<Xu/p)=Sign(iu/pu)=Sign(IAI x 101) (3.3.2a)
Sign(Xr/p) =Sign(ir/pu)=-Sign (IAI x 101) (3.3.2b)
. Theeffectof changesin Pr onXi andii' (i=u,r),canbeworkedoutto give
analogousconclusions.
7In whatfollows,theshift parameterT will bereferredto asthedistortionandtheshift
parameterT asthedifferential.
















I~~~I[ex(£rt+"r~)- 1/- "r£u (1+X)(OuKOrL- °rKOuL)]
~~~I [ex£rlJ>-11- "r£u(1+X)(OuKOrL- °rKOuL)]
t=("rOr+"uou)OrLOuL~O
q,=("°° L +"° ° L) >0rru uur =

















x = [eT(OuKOrL- °uL °rK)/IAI] T







l(T) =- IDlilll L(Qr~+Kr~)- KrQu(1+X)(8uK8rL- 8rK8uL) (3.5.2)
Lu eT
[ ;-/(1')=- IDIIlll (QrifJ-KrQu(1+X)(8uK8rL-8rK8uL)J










4. THE EFFECT OF WAGESUBSIDIESONURBANOUTPUTAND
EMPLOYMENT
In thissectionweshallusethe precedingresultsto giveconditionsunder
whichtheeffectsof wagesubsidiesonoutputandemploymentdependontheagree-
mentor conflictof thesignsof IDI andIlli. Weshallconsiderbothadvalorem
andspecificwagesubsidiesaswellasurbanincometaxesanddenotethemby Si'
Vi and Tu respectively,i = u, r. For subsequentnotationalconvenience,let
s.=(l-S.), v.=-V. andt =1- T . Thewagepaidoutin theiffi sectorisgivenby1 1 1 1 U U
w.s.+v.andthatreceivedbyurbanworkersist w . Intheresultsreportedbelow,1 1 1 U U
weshallbeconsideringchangesin s.,v.andt andthereadershouldbemindfulof1 1 U






tions of n(.) and quantifiedby the elasticitiese, e, and et wheres y
e.=alogn(.)1alogj ,j =s,v,t. Secondly,awagesubsidyleadstoaceterisparibusJ u
cheapeningof labourin theurbansectorwhereasthe incometaxmakesit less
attractivefor themigrant.Boththeseeffectsmakethemselvesfeltonlyon the
equation(2.8)leadingto
R P -8' LeTT-8' L (1+e)s -8' L (e +(v II-v ))v -8' Lettu u u su u y u u u u u
[ll'] Iwr 1=11\ - 8;Lsr--8rLvrvr (4.1)
~ eTT - i+eS +e v +(1+e) tsu yU t u ---'
'wherev.=v./(w.s.+v.),8:L =8'L (1-v.) andll' is II with 8'L ' 8'L substitutedfor1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 U r
8uL,8rL'
The followingobservationsnow follow frominspection.
Proposition4.1
The effect of rural wagesubsidieson urban output and employmentis
equivalento achangein ruralprices.
Proposition4.2
The effectof urbanincometaxeson urbanoutputand employmentis
equivalentto
(i) achangeinurbanpricesif et equals-1; and
(ii) achangein thedistortionforallothervaluesofet'
Proposition4.3
The effect of urban wagesubsidieson urban output and employmentis
equivalento
(i) achangein urbanpricesprovidede or e arezero;s y
(ii) achangein thedifferentialprovidedesequals-1 andey=- (vu/l-v); and
(iii) ach~ngein thedistortionforallothervaluesof theelasticities.
Proposition4.1 coupledwithSection3.3,givestheunambiguousresultthat
ruralwagesubsidiesleadto perverseresponsesof urbanoutputandemployment
if andonlyif Illi andIDI conflict. Ruralwagesubsidieshavenotbeengenerally
discussedin the literature,the Corden-Findlaystudybeingtheexception.As
pointedoutin theintroduction,Illi is alwayspositivein theirmodelandwethus
obtaina paradoxif and only if the rural sectoris morecapital-intensive
in unemployment-adjustedtermsthantheruralsector,afactnotexplicitlynotedby
them.
(IDIx Illl)>0 (IDIx Illl)<0
IDI<O,Illl<O IDI>O,Illl>O IDI<O,Illl>O IDI>O,Illl<O
X)f CX)f) ? (?) - (+) ? (?) + (-)
Lu/f (Lrff) ? (?) - (+) ? (?) + (-)
/T (X)T) - (+) ? (?) + (-) ? (?)
- IT (LIT) - (+) ? (?) + (-) ? (?)Lu r
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Propositions4.2and4.3hingeon thevaluesof theelasticitieset' e andes y
whichin turndependonthelabourmarketconditionsemphasizedin themodel.In
theremainderof thissectionweturnto theexaminationof thisdependence.Our
discussionalsobringsouttheinnocuousnatureof theStandingHypothesis.
hasa determinatesign.Equation(4.2.2)doesnot involveconditionson a andr
a asis requiredfor determiningthesignof changesinT underboththerigid-wageu
andefficiency-wagehypotheses.
4.1.TheRigidWageHypothesis




capitalby Stiglitz[19;21]. In thissettingtheurbanwageissetbytheemployerso
astominimizeindirectanddirectlabourcostsgivenby
w =t (Ts +v )u u u u (4.1.1)
(wusu- vu)-Tq(tuw)wr' X) (4.3.1)
whereT is theexogenouslygivenrigidwage.Equation (4.1.1)leadsto eX=ew=eR
=0,et=1,andpositivevaluesofeT'esandey.Thustheeffectsofurbanincome
taxesandwagesubsidiesareequivalenttochangesin thedistortionandhencesubject
to theconclusionsobtainedin Section3.5andcollectedinTable2. Theambiguous






















in nutritionandbiologicalefficiency.like therigidwagemodel,it alsogiveszero
valuesto ew' eX and eR anda positivevalueto eT; however,herees= -1,
. v
1 u
e =-(-)ande =-t I-v y 1-u u
equivalentto thatof anurbanpricechange;otherwiseit is equivalenttochangesin
thedistortion.Theeffectof achangein theurbanwagesubsidiesi equivalentto
changesin thedifferential.Theambiguousentriespertainingtochangesin l' canbe
madedeterminateif andonlyif
(ex(£l +Kr~)- (3)and(eX£rl/>- (3) (4.2.3)
. If v =0, theeffectof urbanincometaxesisu
havedeterminatesigns,where(3=K £ (1+X)(0 L - ° Ko L).ru r r u
. Stiglitzhasdiscussedall thesechangesin theimmobilecapitalsetting;werefer
thereadertohispapersforacomparisonofhisresultswithours.
°rL - °rKOuL (4.2.2)
4.4. TheTradeUnionHypotheses
In Calvo[6], theendogenousrbanwageis determinedasaconsequenceof
tradeunionactions.Heassumescapitalimmobilityandinvestigatestwobehavioural
hypotheses.Underthefirst,thetradeuniondeterminestheurbanwagesoasto
maximizea utility functionmvenby L (w -w) andwith theurbanemployer0" u u r
passivelyagreeingto theunion'sactions.Calvoalsoassumesfor theurbansectora9Thisis thecaseanalyzedbyCordenandFindlay.
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Cobb-Douglasproductionfunctionwith exponenta and thisleadshim to his
equation(13),giveninournotationby










The ambiguousentriespertainingto suchchanges~nTable 2 can be made
determinateif andonlyif equations(3.5.2)and(3.5.3)havedeterminesigns.Finally,
notethatv =0 impliesthate =1ande =O. Thisleadsto theresulthatincomeu w s
taxandadvaloremsubsidychangesareequivalenttourbanpricechanges.






readeris referredto theoverviewprovidedby Calvo[5] for detailsandreferences.
The discussionis confinedalmostsolelyto developedeconomiesbut Calvois
obviouslyawareof therelevanceof theideasto lessdevelopedeconomies.The
basicideais thatanemployermakesup for lackof supervisionbypayinga wage
higherthanwhattheworkercouldearnelsewhere.Thus,inournotation,effortx in
theurbansectorisgivenby
x =f (t w - w ), f (0);;;'0,f' >0,f" <0u u r (4.5.1)
Theurbanwageis setsoasto maximizeurbanprofitsgivenby





whereIl is theelasticityof theeffortfunctiongivenasequation(4.5.1).Thisform
of the n(.) function yields e;\ =eR =0 and ew > O.Let us now assumefor
simplicitythatIl is constant.If Vu=0,theeffectsofurbanincometaxesandof
advaloremwagesubsidiesi identicalto thosegeneratedbyanurbanpricechange.








































1RW,EW,LT, TU andCS areobviousabbreviationsof thefivehypothesesdiscussedin Section4.
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5. ANADJUSTMENTPROCESS
In thissection,weturnto question(b) posedin theintroductionandpresent
anadjustmentprocessunderwhichanequilibriumis locallyasymptoticallystable
if andonlyif 101andI~Ihaveidenticalsigns.
Oenoteby P an adjustmentprocesswhichis definedby the following
differentialequations:
DKr=4>{(R/R) - 1J
DL =1/I[w (1+A)!w) -I }r r u
DA =1f {(S1(.)!wu)- I}
4>' > 0, 4>(0)=0
1/1'> 0, 1/1(0)=0
1f'> 0, 1f(0)=0
whereD is thetimederivativeoperatorandR. is therentalin sectori, i =u,r. Pis1
verymuchin thesamespiritastheadjustmentprocesspresentedby Neary[17].
Thefirsttwoequationsshowthatcapitalflowsintothesectorwithahigherental
and thatlabourmigratesinto a sectorwith a higherexpectedwage. The last
equationeedsomewhatmorejustification.Recallthattheurbanwageis being
determinedbyagentsin theurbansectorinaccordancewithS1(wr'A,Ru'T). As.the
dynamicprocessunfolds,thiscalculatedurbanwageis comparedwith the one
actuallyprevailing:if it is identicalto it, theurbanemploymentdecisionsremain
unchanged;if not,urbanlabourishiredorfiredleadingtochangesinA.
In thesequel,weshalltakeanequilibriumto bevaluesof theendogenous
variableswhenDK =DL =DA=O. Wenowhaver r
Assumption5.1
In equilibrium101+ 0, I~I + 0 and ew(au-1) ~0,eA~0,eR~O.
Theorem5.1
. GivenAssumption5.1,anequilibriumislocally,asymptoticallystableif and





(0) = 1; it canbeeasilycheckedthatthisis donewithoutanylossof generality.
Linearizationof thedifferentialequationsaroundtheequilibriumvalues(denotedby
starredsuperscripts)gives
lOThe part of Assumption5.1 pertainingto e is not requiredto show that stability





















(J K (J (J L (J
( rK +~ uK) -( rK + * r * uK) I _(JUK
ar ~ au ar L/1+A )au au
E






wherea33=eA- (l!au)«(JuK + eR(JuL)'
Webeginby showingthat(lDI'I~I)> 0 is sufficientfor localasymptotic
stability.By aTheoreminHirschandSmale[12,p.181], asufficientconditionfor
localasymptoticstabilityof equilibriumis thatthe3 x 3 matrixA in equation
(5.1.1)hasalleigenvalueswithnegativerealparts.A sufficientconditionforthisis
givenbyll
det(A)< 0; trace(A) < 0;m=(-a) trace(A) +det(A)> 0 (5.1.2)
wherea is thesumof principalminorsofA of ordertwo. In whatfollowsweignore
thestars.It canbecheckedbyroutinealgebrathat
L k
det(A)=;~ ,/(l:A -kr) [(JrL(JuK(l-eA)+(JULeR)+(JrK(JuL(eA-eW)](5.1.3)u r "\1
Thenegativityof thetraceis obviousby inspection.All thatremainsi thesignof
m. Onexpandingdet(A)alongthethirdcolumn,weobtain
. (JuK
m =-(al1+a22+a33)(Al1+A22)-A23-(al1+a22)A33 +(a13A13+-A23)au (5.1.4)
By routinecalculationsandthroughtheuseofAssumption5.1,thiscanbeshownto
bepositive.
To showthatstabilityimplies(lDI'I~1)> 0, wehaveto appealto another
theoremin HirschandSmale[12,p. 187]. This assuresus that,underlocal,
asymptoticstability,noneof therootsof thecharacteristiccubicof A canhave
positiverealparts.Sincetheproductof theserootsequalsdet(A)whichisassumed
llThis derivationis alongthelinesfoundin Neary[17]; see,in particular,theAppendix
to his paper.WithA=0,thefirstprincipalminorof order2 of ourmatrixis preciselythematrix
consideredby Neary.
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pon-zeroby Assumption5.1(asaconsequenceof equation(5.1.3»,theonlywaya
rootcanhaveazerorealpartis by beingpurelyimaginary.Supposethistobethe
case,i.e.thethreerootsarea. :t{3i'witha negativeand(3beingof arbitararysign.
But this guaranteesthat det(A) =- a(- (32)< 0 and we are homeby virtue of
equation(5.1.3).Thus,weonlyneedtoconsiderthecasewhenall therootshave
negativerealparts. But a necessaryconditionfor thisis alsogivenby12equation
(5.1.2)andtheproofisagainfinishedbyvirtueofequation(5.1.3). Q.E.D.
Thissectionwillbeleftincompleteif wedonotaskhowrobustTheorem5.1is
with respecto changesin theunderlyingadjustmentprocess.Nearyposesthis
questionin thecontextof hiswage-differentialsettingandconcludes,"whileit is
notdifficultto devisealternativeplechanisms,thereisnoreasontobelievethatthey
implydifferentstabilityconditions."Unfortunately,thisis no longertruein the
richsettingof thegeneralizedHarris-Todaromodel.Indeed(lDIx I~I)> 0 is not
equivalentto stabilityof equilibriumof a ratherobviousadjustmentprocessof a
Walrasiankind;forexample
Dw =L +L (w /w) - £r r u u r
DR =K +K -"r u
Dwu=n(wr'w)wr'R)- wu'








l2See,for example,Coppel[7,p. 158) andAyres[2, Problem1,p. 152).
laThe relevantmatrixis






relevancewhentheobjectis, in part,to showthatthecoherencebroughtoutby
Nearydoesnot fully extendto a richerandmorecomplicatedtheoryof factor
marketdistortions.
6. IMPLICATIONSFOR COMMERCIALPOLICY





lettingE unitsof theagriculturalgoodexchangeforh(E)unitsof themanufacturing
goodwhere
h(0) =0,h' > 0,h" < 0 (6.1)
A positiveE isinterpretedasnetexportsandequation(6.1)bringsoutthefactthat
themarginalndaveraget rmsof tradedeclineasE increases.
Welfareis measuredby a concaveutility functionU(.) whichis definedon
domesticonsumption(Zr' Z) andwhichhaspositivemarginalutilitiesfor each
good.Feasibilityrequires
Z =X - E andZ =X +h(E)r r u u (6.2)
whereX andX arethesuppliesof thetwocommodities,propertiesofwhichhaver u
beendiscussedatlengthin thesectionsabove.




Theycarryout thisinvestigationi termsof the primalvariables,i.e.withthe
marginalratesof substitutionsubstitutedfor theprices.Thisinvolvesconsiderable
algebrandtheirapproachbecomesespeciallycomplicatedinoursettingwithmobile
capitaland with the urbanwagegivenby n(.). Wework with morenatural
independentvariablesin thedualsetting.
Letg(Pr'Pu'U) betheminimumexpenditurewithgivenpricesPr'PJl required
to reachalevelofwelfareU. It iswellknown(see,forexample,Gorman[9])thatg
l6Seeespeciallytheconclusionto Chapter12in Arrow andHahn[I].
1 La I L a (1+X)La Lu au
--( +(1+X)L) - (--!.....!..+ u u) -(1--)
wr °rK u R °rL nul wr °uK
Ka Ka a Kuaur r
_l(+)
wOK R °rL nul wuOuKr r
(1+X)(ew-eX) (wueR/R) (e7\-1)
20 M. Ali Khan
is (i) positivelyhomogeneousof degreeonein prices,(ii) a concavefunctionof the
prices,and(iii) thatgi = 3g/3Pi= Zj (i =u, r). In addition,theassumptionof both
goodsbeingnormalimpliesgio=32g/3pi3U, i =u, r, arepositive.Wecannow write
thebalanceof tradeandfeasibilityequationsas
E - ph(E)=0;p =pulPr (6.3a)
8r- Xr =-E and8u- Xu=h(E) (6.3b)
with p, E and U astheunknowns. The effectof a changein welfarefor a change
in aparametera is simplydU/da whichcanbeextractedfrom
- h(E) 1- ph'(E)
gru - (oX/3p)
8uu- (oXul3p) - h'(E)
It is easyto showusingequation(6.1), alongwiththeelementaryproperties
of the expenditurefunction listedabove,that the determinant,IBI, of thematrix
in equation(6.4)is negativeif thesupplyresponsesarewell-behaved,Le. 3X /op<Or
and o~/op>O. Denoteby C the matrix obtainedby substituting3X/oa for the
entries8jo' (i=u, r), in thematrixB. Applicationof Cramer'srulethengives
(dU/3a) =ICI/IBI (6.5)
Sincegio' i =u, r, areboth positiveand(oXi/oa), i =u, r, aregenerallyof opposite
signs,ICI will, in general,beunsigned.This isjustanotherwayof sayingthatwelfare
canincreaseor decreaseasaconsequenceof changesin a. Thusequation(6.5)canbe
usedtocharacterizeth optimalvaluesofa,Le.theequationICl/IBI=O. However,
ratherthangivenecessaryconditionsfortheoptimalityofasecond.bestpolicy,asin
thevariousappendicesin Stiglitz[21] or in Khan [15], BhagwatiandSrinivasan
[3; 18]lookfor sufficientconditionsunderwhichasmallperturbationofaparticular
parameterof a distortedeconomyimproveswelfare,Le. sufficientconditionsfor
dU/da to be positive. Their analysisimplicitly relieson the observationthatuseof
equations(2.2),(2.3)and(2.6)yieldsI6
oX w s v aL oX oKr~- (~+~ ) (--.2+L -)-R-p 3a - - t (1+X) oa u oa oau
(6.6)

















3, we cannow providesufficientconditionsunderwhichsmallperturbationsof
variouspolicyinstrumentsleadtoimprovementsinwelfarestartingfrominitialposi-
tionsof laisseztaire. Weleaveit to theinterestedreaderto providesucha catalogue.
Whatshouldbeemphasized,however,is thatstabilityof ouradjustmentprocessis
not sufficientby itself. To seethis,go backto equation(6.8)andconsidera
situationwhenachangein a impliesachangeinthedistortion.Here(101x 161)>0
is sufficientto sign3X/aabutnotax /aa. Forsituationswhenachangeina impliesr
a pricechange,thesituatiotlis reversedandfor thecaseof a differentialchange,
(lDIx 161)> 0 is notsufficientosigneithertheoutputortheunemploymentrate
changes.However,theflavourof theresultschangesconsiderablywhenweshift
froma"large"economytoa"small"one.18







Let theeconomyhaveno monopolypowerin trade. Thengivenan initial
laisseztaueequilibrium,thereexistwelfare.improvingchangesin
(I) thedistrotionif andonlyif (101x 161)>0
(ii) thedifferentialif andonlyif -eX (101/161)> 1
I7Note thatthe fust termon therighthandsideof (6.8)canbesimplifiedfurther.Given
positivehomogeneityof degree0 of gu' gur + pguuequalszero. Similarlyananalogof (6.7)
for changesin p Yields- (aX13p+p3X 13p)equaltow L 3Ai3p.r u r u
I8This is not sofor theBhagwati-Srinivasansetting.CompareTheorem2,for example,of
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(iii) theurbanpriceif andonlyif (l-e,,) (IDI!I~I)>(Z !X )/\ U u
.c-LiZ !X)
theruralpriceif andonlyif (ew~A)(IDI!I~I)> 1'.-Lr rr
(iv)
Our primaryinterest,of course,is in theexistenceof welfare-improving
changesin wagesubsidiesandincometaxes;but thenPropositions4.1to 4.3and
Table3 relatechangesin thesepoliciestotheabstractchangesdiscussedinTheorem
6.1. Thisresultis thusa far.reachinggeneralizationf Theorem2 in Bhagwatiand
Srinivasan[3]; it allowscapitalmobility,a varietyof subsidiesandtaxes,anda








instabilityof equilibriumfor a suitablyformulatedadjustmentprocess.However,
thislackof correspondenceis by no meansuniversalanddependson thelabour-
marketconditionsprevailingin theurbansector. Wehavealsoshownthatthe
Bhagwati-Srinivasanpropositionis valid,for a smalleconomy,underconditions
whichcorrespondto stabilityof equilibriumfor theaforementioneda justment
process.However,thistoois notuniversalanddependson urbanlabour-market
conditions.Wewerealsoableto showthattheseconditionsarenot sufficient









of Jones[14J andNeary[17];it isdoubtfulwhetherthisextensionwouldaddany.
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